LinkedIn checks for 2953 browser extensions (github.com)
189 points by mdp 3 hours ago
cbsks 2 hours ago
Looks like Firefox is immune.
This works by looking for web accessible resources that are provided by the extensions. For Chrome, these are are available in a webpage via the URL chrome-extension://[PACKAGE ID]/[PATH] https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/manif...
On Firefox, web accessible resources are available at "moz-extension://<extension-UUID>/myfile.png" <extension-UUID> is not your extension's ID. This ID is randomly generated for every browser instance. This prevents websites from fingerprinting a browser by examining the extensions it has installed. https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/Web...
rchaud an hour ago
And they said that using a browser with sub-5% market share would cause us to miss out on the latest and greatest in web technology!
dana321 an hour ago
chrome was made by ex-firefox devs, chrome is still not as good!
awesome_dude an hour ago
This is probably a naive question, but...
Doesn't the idea of swapping extension specific IDs to your browser specific extension IDs mean that instead of your browser being identifiable, you become identifiable?
I mean, it goes from "Oh they have X, Y , and Z installed" to "Oh, it's jim bob, only he has that unique set of IDs for extensions"
triceratops an hour ago
It's not a naive question. This comment says it's not possible to do that: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46905213
awesome_dude an hour ago
b112 an hour ago
Maybe, but how long are the extension ids? And if they are random, how long to scan a trillion random alphanumeric ids, to find matches?
I presume the extension knows when it wants to access resources of its own. But random javascript, doesn't.
maples37 an hour ago
rdoherty 2 hours ago
Skimming the list, looks like most extensions are for scraping or automating LinkedIn usage. Not surprising as there's money to be made with LinkedIn data. Scraping was a problem when I worked there, the abuse teams built some reasonably sophisticated detection & prevention, and it was a constant battle.
cxr an hour ago
In order to create the data source that LinkedIn's extension-fingerprinting relies on to work, someone (at LinkedIn*?) almost certainly violated the Chrome Web Store TOS—by (perversely*) scraping it.
* if LinkedIn didn't get it from an existing data source
winddude an hour ago
a problem for linkedin != "a problem". The real problem for people is the back room data brokering linkedin and others do.
bryanrasmussen 2 hours ago
from the code doesn't look like they do anything if they have a match, they just save all the results to a csv for fingerprinting?
cxr an hour ago
"The code" here you're referring to (fetch_extension_names.js[1]) isn't and doesn't claim to be LinkedIn's fingerprinting code. It's a scraper that the researcher behind this repo wrote in order to themselves create the CSV of the data that they're publishing.
LinkedIn's fingerprinting code, as the README explains, is found in fingerprint.js[2], which embeds a big JSON literal with the IDs of the extensions it probes for. (Sickeningly enough, this data starts about two-thirds of the way through the file* and isn't the culprit behind the bulk of its 2.15 MB size…)
* On line 34394; the one starting:
const r = [{
id: "aacbpggdjcblgnmgjgpkpddliddineni",
file: "sidebar.html"
1. <https://github.com/mdp/linkedin-extension-fingerprinting/blo...>2. <https://github.com/mdp/linkedin-extension-fingerprinting/blo...>
hsbauauvhabzb 2 hours ago
Wont someone think of poor little LinkedIn, a subsidiary of one of the largest data brokers in the world?
charcircuit 2 hours ago
Why frame what you are trying to say like that? Businesses of all sizes deserve the ability to protect their businesses from abuse.
jmward01 2 hours ago
ronsor 2 hours ago
nitwit005 an hour ago
sellmesoap 2 hours ago
b112 an hour ago
schmidtleonard 2 hours ago
xp84 2 hours ago
I mean, regardless of who they are or even if you don’t like what LinkedIn does themselves with the data people have given them, the random third parties with the extensions don’t additionally deserve to just grab all that data too, do they?
josephg an hour ago
mathfailure 2 hours ago
hsbauauvhabzb 42 minutes ago
bastard_op 43 minutes ago
Chrome is the new IE6. Google set themselves up to be the next Microsoft and is "ad friendly" in all the creepy ways because that's what Google IS an ad company. All they've contributed to security is diminishing the capability of adblockers and letting malware to do bad things to you as consumers.
0xbadcafebee 40 minutes ago
He who controls the Ads, controls the Internet.
themafia 40 minutes ago
> Google set themselves up to be the next Microsoft
Google became a monopoly. All monopolies do this.
minkeymaniac 2 hours ago
I can confirm.. open up linkedIn.. hit F12 and watch the error count keep going up and up and up
Screenshots found here https://x.com/DenisGobo/status/2018334684879438150
9021007 2 hours ago
xcancel link: https://xcancel.com/DenisGobo/status/2018334684879438150
shouldnt_be an hour ago
I wrote an article about it a couple of months ago. I also explain why, how and a way to prevent it.
https://javascript.plainenglish.io/the-extensions-you-use-ar...
jmholla an hour ago
To clarify, you talk about why it's possible, not why LinkedIn is doing it, right? Or did I miss something in your article.
avastel an hour ago
I wrote a blog post recently about the technique used by LinkedIn to do extension probing, as well as other ways to do it with less side effects
https://blog.castle.io/detecting-browser-extensions-for-bot-...
DOM100 9 minutes ago
const nameA = getName(a).toLowerCase(); const nameB = getName(b).toLowerCase(); return nameA.localeCompare(nameB);
const msg = createDoneMessage(); msg.style.opacity = '1';
console.log("Extensions sorted alphabetically!");
console.table(sortedCards.map(c => ({
name: getName(c),
id: c.id || '—'zahlman 2 hours ago
> This repository documents every extension LinkedIn checks for and provides tools to identify them.
I get that the CSV lists the extensions, and the tools are provided in order to show work (mapping IDs to actual software). But how was it determined that LinkedIn checks for extensions with these IDs?
And is this relevant for non-Chrome users?
usefulposter 2 hours ago
Technical writeup from a few weeks ago by a vendor that explains how LinkedIn does it, then boasts that their approach is "quieter, harder to notice, and easier to run at scale":
https://blog.castle.io/detecting-browser-extensions-for-bot-...
dwedge 31 minutes ago
I wonder if this is why the linkedin feed blocker I installed in Firefox 2 weeks ago stopped working for me within 24 hours
DrStartup an hour ago
Setup a quick CDP connection. Have Claude Code attach and inject JS into Page.addScriptToEvaluateOnNewDocument. Loads before the page.
Typical early hooks: • fetch wrapper • XMLHttpRequest.prototype.open/send wrapper • WebSocket constructor wrapper • history.pushState/replaceState wrapper • EventTarget.addEventListener wrapper (optional, heavy) • MutationObserver for DOM diffs • Error + unhandledrejection capture
HumanOstrich 25 minutes ago
This is irrelevant to the article and discussions here. Weird copypasta bullet points too.
shj2105 an hour ago
what would this do?
mongrelion 2 hours ago
Curious question: why would they check for installed extensions on one's browser?
CobrastanJorji an hour ago
Fingerprinting. There are a few reasons you'd do it:
1. Bot prevention. If the bots don't know that you're doing this, you might have a reliable bot detector for a while. The bots will quite possibly have no extensions at all, or even better specific exact combination they always use. Noticing bots means you can block them from scraping your site or spamming your users. If you wanna be very fancy, you could provide fake data or quietly ignore the stuff they create on the site.
2. Spamming/misuse evasion. Imagine an extension called "Send Messages to everybody with a given job role at this company." LinkedIn would prefer not to allow that, probably because they'd want to sell that feature.
3. User tracking.
xz18r 2 minutes ago
I wrote some automation scripts that are not triggered via browser extensions (e.g., open all my sales colleagues’ profiles and like their 4 most recent unliked posts to boost their SSI[1], which is probably the most ‘innocent’ of my use-cases). It has random sleep intervals. I’ve done this for years and never faced a ban hammer.
Wonder if with things like Moltbot taking the scene, a form of “undetectable LinkedIn automation” will start to manifest. At some point they won’t be able to distinguish between a chronically online seller adding 100 people per day with personalized messages, or an AI doing it with the same mannerisms.
[1] https://business.linkedin.com/sales-solutions/social-selling...
jppope 2 hours ago
most automations for sales and marketing use browser extensions... linkedIn wants you using their tools not 3rd party
Nextgrid 2 hours ago
Their own tools suck, that’s the issue.
staticshock 2 hours ago
For a social network, more information about their users = better ad targeting. It likely gets plumbed into models to inform user profiles.
Aurornis 2 hours ago
Look at the actual list. It's primarily questionable AI tools, scrapers, lead generation tools, and other plugins in that vein.
I would guess this is for rate limiting and abuse detection.
HPsquared 2 hours ago
An attempt at fingerprinting, I suppose?
mrkramer 23 minutes ago
LinkedIn is the worst walled garden of all of them.
ta988 28 minutes ago
So it really is espionage at all levels.
hasperdi 2 hours ago
Another thing... they alter the localStorage & sessionStorage prototype, by wrapping the native ones with a wrapper that prevent keys that not in their whitelist from being set.
You can try this by opening devtools and setting
localStorage.setItem('hi', 123)input_sh an hour ago
cut -d',' -f2 chrome_extensions_with_names_all.csv | grep -c "AI"
474
Only 16%!?Aurornis 2 hours ago
I suggest everyone take a look at the list of extensions and their names for some very important context: https://github.com/mdp/linkedin-extension-fingerprinting/blo...
I didn't find popular extensions like uBlock or other ad blockers.
The list is full of scammy looking data collection and AI tools, though. Some random names from scrolling through the list:
- LinkedGPT: ChatGPT for LinkedIn
- Apollo Scraper - Extract & Export Apollo B2B Leads
- AI Social Media Assistant
- LinkedIn Engagement Assistant
- LinkedIn Lead Magnet
- LinkedIn Extraction Tool - OutreachSheet
- Highperformr AI - Phone Number and Email Finder
- AI Agent For Jobs
These look like the kind of tools scummy recruiters and sales people use to identify targets for mass spamming. I see several AI auto-application tools in there too.
NicuCalcea 26 minutes ago
LinkedIn itself provides tools for scummy recruiters to mass spam, so this is just them protecting their business.
Also, not all of them are data collection tools. There are ad blockers listed (Hide LinkedIn Ads, SBlock - Super Ad Blocker) and just general extensions (Ground News - Bias Checker, Jigit Studio - Screen Recorder, RealEyes.ai — Detect Deepfakes Across Online Platforms, Airtable Clipper).
tech234a 2 hours ago
See also: a demo page for the same technique that can enumerate many extensions installed in your browser: https://browserleaks.com/chrome
xnx 29 minutes ago
Yuck. Disgusting that extension detection is possible.
unstatusthequo an hour ago
I’m probably on the list. I made a LinkedIn Redactor that allowed you to add keywords and remove posts from your thread that included such words. It’s the X feature but for LinkedIn. Anyway, got a cease and desist from those lame fucks at LI. So I removed from the chrome store but it’s still available on GitHub.
lapcat 2 hours ago
[removed]
ronsor 2 hours ago
This is a security vulnerability and should be patched. Sorry, LinkedIn.
(Alternatively extension developers can modify their extensions to block these requests!)
0cf8612b2e1e 2 hours ago
No kidding. I am shocked this works.
Does Firefox have a similar weakness?
tech234a 2 hours ago
cxr 2 hours ago
burkaman 2 hours ago
MrGilbert 2 hours ago
I'm not sure how you'd patch that. Any request that’s made from the current open tab / window is made on behalf of the user. From my point of view, it's impossible for the browser to know, if the request is legit or not.
ronsor 2 hours ago
toomuchtodo 2 hours ago
Is there no browser setting to defend against this attack? If not, there should be, versus relying on extension authors to configure or enable such a setting.
zahlman 2 hours ago
chocolatkey 2 hours ago
That’s incorrect, it’s trying to load an asset (hardcoded unique per-extension path) for each extension, there is a huge list of these in the source code: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mdp/linkedin-extension-fin...
jsheard 2 hours ago
Looks to me like LinkedIn is fetching chrome-extension://{extension id}/{known filename} and seeing if it succeeds, not pinging the web store.
Should be patched nonetheless though, that's a pretty obscene fingerprinting vector.
what an hour ago
How do you patch it? The extensions themselves (presumably) need to access the same web accessible resources from their content scripts. How do you differentiate between some extension’s content script requesting the resource and LinkedIn requesting it?
jsheard an hour ago
halapro 2 hours ago
If this is true, it's insane that this would work:
- why does CWS respond to cross-site requests?
- why is chrome sending the credentials (or equivalent) in these requests?
- why is the button enabled server-side and not via JS? Google must be confident in knowing the exact and latest state of your installed extensions enough to store it on their servers, I guess
cxr 2 hours ago
It's not true. The person you're responding to has a habit of posting implausible-but-plausibly-plausible nonsense, and it's not how this works at all.
lapcat an hour ago
cobertos 2 hours ago
Wouldn't that mean 2900 requests from fingerprint.js??
usefulposter 2 hours ago
Isn't it enumerating web_accessible_resources? Below static collectFeatures(e, t) there is a mapping of extension IDs to files in the const r (Minified JS, obviously.)
Edit: Confirmed. It's not pinging the Chrome Web Store. https://blog.castle.io/detecting-browser-extensions-for-bot-...