Trivy under attack again: Widespread GitHub Actions tag compromise secrets (socket.dev)

87 points by jicea a day ago

deathanatos 36 minutes ago

My initial thought is that if this isn't a new compromise, Trivy must not have rotated the old credentials. They claim, however,

> We rotated secrets and tokens, but the process wasn't atomic and attackers may have been privy to refreshed tokens

… does anyone know what exactly they're talking about, here? To my knowledge, GH does not divulge new tokens after they're issued, but it depends on the exact auth type we're talking about, and GH has an absurd number of different types of tokens/keys one can use.

dist-epoch 18 minutes ago

OpenClaw creator made some related claims, that as soon as he created a GitHub organization with a new name, somehow it was stolen from him, and he had to ask Github people to do it for him atomically.

PunchyHamster an hour ago

You're supposed to scan for vulnerabilities, not become one!

jl6 17 minutes ago

When you stare into the vuln, the vuln stares back at you.

d3nit 10 minutes ago

Well, not my best 2 weeks at work, now I have to fill out a dozen forms and sit trough a shitload of meeting, just because they got pwned (twice, or once, but really badly :D )

dang 2 hours ago

Recent and related:

Trivy ecosystem supply chain temporarily compromised - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47450142 - March 2026 (35 comments)

wolfi1 41 minutes ago

temporarily might be a bit of an euphemism here

dizhn 16 minutes ago

temporally

Shank 2 hours ago

> On March 22, 2026, a threat actor used compromised credentials to publish a malicious Trivy v0.69.5 and v0.69.6 DockerHub images. (https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy/security/advisories/GH...)

So the first incident was on March 19th and the second incident is March 22nd —- evidently the attackers maintained persistence through maybe two separate credential rotation efforts.

kevincloudsec 42 minutes ago

second breach in a month from the same initial credential compromise. the first rotation didn't fully revoke access. the attacker walked right back in. no persistence needed.

progbits 2 hours ago

Friendly reminder that just because someone is building security software it doesn't mean they are competent and won't cause more harm than good.

Every month the security team wants me to give full code or cloud access to some new scanner they want to trial. They love the fancy dashboards and lengthy reports but if I allowed just 10% of what they wanted we would be pwned on the regular...

cedws 2 hours ago

I audited Trivy's GitHub Actions a while back and found some worrying things, the most worrying bit was in the setup-trivy Action where it was doing a clone of main of the trivy repo and executing a shell script in there. There was no ref pinning until somebody raised a PR a few months ago. So a security company gave themselves arbitrary code execution in everyone's CI workflows.

Aqua were breached earlier this month, failed to contain it, got breached again last week, failed to contain it again, and now the attackers have breached their Docker Hub account. Shit happens but they're clearly not capable of handling this and should be enlisting outside help.

hrmtst93837 an hour ago

Granting broad access to "security" tools so some vendor can take another shot at your prod keys is not risk reduction. Most of these things are just report printers that makes more noise than a legacy SIEM, and once an attacker is inside they don't do much besides dump findings into a dashboard nobody will read.

If you want less self-inflicted damage, stick new scanners in a tight sandbox, feed them read-only miror data, and keep them away from prod perms until they have earned trust with a boring review of exactly what they touch and where the data goes. Otherwise you may as well wire your secrets to a public pastebin and call it testing.

progbits 26 minutes ago

Couldn't agree more.

Yet many of these tools have setup like: create a service account, give it about thousand permissions (if not outright full ownership) and send us the JSON private key.

At least they make the red flag nice and obvious.

hootz 2 hours ago

Most of corporate security nowadays involves "endpoint security solutions" installed on all devices, servers and VMs, piping everything into an AI-powered dashboard so we can move fast and break everything.

huslage an hour ago

How the heck are credential compromises still a thing with 2FA and refresh tokens???

febusravenga 14 minutes ago

How bugs are still possible now when we all write everything in Rust?

xinayder 2 hours ago

Wasn't this discovered already last week, on Friday, that the threat actor had replaced the legit images with malware images? And republished 75 out of 76 tags?

Shank 2 hours ago

No, the actor reappeared. This article is not fully updated. On March 22nd, the actor compromised their DockerHub account and published new Docker images.

h1fra 2 hours ago

/s But I thought npm was the issue, and all of this couldn't happen anywhere else?!

hootz 2 hours ago

What if we just rebuild everything from scratch with AI? No more supply chain attacks!

classified 2 hours ago

Just use OpenClaw. Oh wait, I think Microslop already did...

classified 2 hours ago

Don't underestimate the prowess of Microslop to fuck up. I'm just glad I saw all of this coming and abandoned this hellscape long ago.

ashishb 2 hours ago

I always run such tools inside sandboxes to limit the blast radius.

PunchyHamster an hour ago

The sandbox will need internet access (to update data) and you will need to send code to test into it; so compromise already equals leaking all your code, without even breaking the sandboxing

ashishb an hour ago

> The sandbox will need internet access (to update data) and you will need to send code to test into it; so compromise already equals leaking all your code, without even breaking the sandboxing

Compromising all code in one directory is bad. Compromising all my data in all other directories, including mounted cloud drives, is worse.

I restrict most dev tools to access only the current directory.

wswin 2 hours ago

I don't think it would help here, they were stealing credentials

tux1968 33 minutes ago

Whenever possible, credentials shouldn't be inside the sandbox either. Credential proxying, or transparent credential injection, for example with Sandcat: https://github.com/VirtusLab/sandcat

yieldcrv 2 hours ago

fatiguing

Pahacker an hour ago

GG

Pahacker an hour ago

jj