AI-Generated GitHub Copilot “Autofix” Allowed Compromise of Snowflake's Jira (wiz.io)
378 points by galnagli 21 hours ago
inahga 19 hours ago
I probably would have made the same mistake. It is negligent to write GitHub Actions without using static analysis.
Use zizmor in CI https://github.com/zizmorcore/zizmor
error[template-injection]: code injection via template expansion
--> .github/workflows/jira_issue.yml:24:29
|
22 | run: |
| --- this run block
23 | # Escape special characters in title and body
24 | TITLE=$(echo '${{ github.event.issue.title }}' | sed 's/"/\\"/g' | sed "s/'/\\\'/g")
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ may expand into attacker-controllable code
|
= note: audit confidence → High
= note: this finding has an auto-fixbtown 19 hours ago
This is a really cool tool! Would zizmor have caught the below as well? From the article:
> The workflow had an if: condition that appeared protective:
> if: (github.event_name == 'issues' && github.event.pull_request.user.login != 'whitesource-for-github-com[bot]')
> However, on issues events, github.event.pull_request is always null. So the condition reduces to (null != 'whitesource-for-github-com[bot]'). This is always true, and every GitHub user passes the gate.
Speaking broadly: it's a massive reminder that AI is trained on a veritable mountain of insecure GitHub Actions examples, many of which "fail open" in highly unpredictable ways even if widely used. Actions is almost unique in this regard, with the combination of a difficult-to-audit language and the type of privileged RCE environment that makes attackers salivate.
(I do think that this stems in part from GitHub's often-inscrutable documentation, and a decision to release Actions without a robust security linting solution, leaving that to the community - but I do understand how it's an uphill battle, and we could have ended up with a much less flexible CI/CD system without this having shipped fast.)
woodruffw 17 hours ago
zizmor wouldn’t catch that condition at the moment, although it does have similar checks for other unsound conditions and incorrect/vulnerable bot actor checks. This one wouldn’t be too hard to add, though.
(Source: I am zizmor’s maintainer.)
btown 16 hours ago
IshKebab 9 hours ago
Frankly it's absurd that you don't get a null reference error in that case. I knew Github Actions was bad... I didn't know it was that bad. This is 90% Github's fault.
saghm 17 hours ago
Shell scripts on their own already are so perilous without static analysis. I'll never understand how we ended up deciding that embed them in yaml instead of requiring an external script file was a reasonable idea.
fizlebit 10 hours ago
yeah it is so mad:
TITLE=$(echo '${{ github.event.issue.title }}' | sed 's/"/\\"/g' | sed "s/'/\\\'/g")
Even in ruby it would have been something like
TITLE=shell_escape(github.event.issue.title)
where shell_escape could at least have unit tests. I don't know anything about github actions, but anything that takes user input needs to be processed with a language that uses static typing I believe to help ensure that the user input doesn't get into expressions given to other programs, shell, sql, or whatever.
Unix was just not made for this sort of thing. It was made for in-house people to write patent applications.
frollogaston 6 hours ago
Bash script embedded in yaml. Wow, I'd view each of those with heavy suspicion on its own, and they're nonlinearly bad together because of how special chars interact.
jiggawatts 6 hours ago
YAML seems reasonable because it allows the sequence of steps to be treated as data, which then enables GUI visualisation, introspection, etc... without actually having to run anything.
That's critical for a platform like GitHub and for devops pipelines in general.
The failure is that "data" ends up being a "terrible custom DSL" that is bad at everything: Not good at data, not a good DSL, and not even a proper programming language.
The best approaches I have seen to this kind of thing are:
- Pulumi: You get to run custom code, but it outputs data. In other words, your "build automation script" must be a pure function taking data in and returning data out. The resulting data is then treated as the "thing" that the pipeline executes, which means that all decisions (parameters, inputs, etc...) have to be "baked in", before the pipeline starts executing.
- Google CUE (Configure Unify Execute): lets you build up JSON using a strongly typed constraint language. Great for huge, complex configuration.
verdverm 3 hours ago
brewmarche 18 hours ago
I get scared when I see these string interpolations in GitHub Actions.
Use `env:` instead and just work with environment variables in your shell script.
Yes, you still need to vet your script. Quoting is a common source of problems. Use shellcheck. Do not call eval/source/python/perl/whatever with untrusted input.
But you removed one layer of problems already by not pasting a value into your shell script code directly.
codedokode 17 hours ago
There should be an array of arguments instead of space-separated string.
netdevphoenix 18 hours ago
Difference is you are not a trillion dollar plus technology hyped as a harbinger of civilisational change.
bonoboTP 17 hours ago
It can be that while also causing problems. It's like when a self driving car crashes, it's big news and everyone runs around like their pants are on fire. When a human driver crashes, it's a blip on local news or not even that.
hennell 13 hours ago
phatfish 15 hours ago
pojzon 15 hours ago
skrtskrt 17 hours ago
CI is shell scripts as a service. There is no safe way to use it.
AI does it a lot faster and ignores rules even harder than humans do, but it's not the root problem here.
inahga 18 hours ago
Sadly I'm not. Either way, how LLMs work mean that traditional software analysis tools are every bit as important as they were in the before times. This is why we see a lot of hype around LLMs and formal verification.
airstrike 15 hours ago
SV_BubbleTime 18 hours ago
I mean… it’s only Monday!
But yes, there is an interesting change in the past decade, where everything new must be over-hyped.
Perhaps it is attention overload and needing to shout. Perhaps it’s that technological progress has significantly slowed while communication options have exploded (coincidence?).
I look at it a lot like EVs. They’re great, if your use case is inside the specific band. But, that isn’t who they were being marketed to. And now… “pushback” is putting it lightly.
nomel 14 hours ago
madeofpalk 19 hours ago
Github Actions is actually so incredibly scary to have on public repo. It's full of so many footguns that's far from obvious.
It's a shame Github is buried under their current server issues, because it would be great to get improvements all of this - at least warning/erroring on these sorts of things themselves.
dataflow 18 hours ago
Would it be fair to say the blame falls squarely on Github? Why do they even allow pasting of arbitrary strings from a title directly into a script? And if they feel there is a reason, what did they imagine the safe way to do it was?
frollogaston 6 hours ago
Honestly I wouldn't make this mistake. I wouldn't know how to fix that particular loc while still using bash for this, but I'd know it's dangerous.
cryo32 17 hours ago
Proof that LLMs are trained on mediocre shit. That is by definition, mediocre shit.
IncreasePosts 17 hours ago
Is that project named after the serial nyc subway advertising dermatologist?
tingletech 17 hours ago
yes, it says "Now you can have beautiful clean workflows!" and links to a youtube video of a TV ad for a dermatologist.
woodruffw 15 hours ago
Yes :-)
mjr00 20 hours ago
It's interesting to look at what was being attempted when the vulnerability was introduced[0]
> Workflows like jira_close.yml use deprecated atlassian JIRA actions and have a dependency on the gh-actions repo. This is not ideal and unecessarily complex. PR updates jira_close workflow to use direct API calls via curl. It preserves custom fields used too.
I won't speak to this projects' management and how they prioritize things, but from my own experience, pre-AI, this type of change would have been firmly in the "this is a minor annoyance, put it in the Tech Debt Backlog alongside the 50000 other tickets" and never actually done. The cost of a human investing the time understanding how to fix the problem, doing code changes, testing them, and deploying them is just way too high for what actual value this change brings, which is close to nothing.
Now with AI, it's as simple as firing up an agent and telling them to make a change; as much effort as writing that backlog Jira ticket in the first place.
Similar to the problem open source is having with low-value PRs, companies are going to have to start realizing that code is not free to review or maintain, even when it's generated for ~free, in their internal processes. Just because an agent can fix a minor tech debt annoyance with a few lines of instructions doesn't mean it should.
[0] https://github.com/snowflakedb/snowflake-connector-net/pull/...
fg137 19 hours ago
I have seen plenty of "my backlog has never been shorter" comments here.
I'm interested in how that turns out 6 months later.
In my team, we have plenty of enhancement requests from users. We address those that make obvious sense and are trivial to do but withhold from others, even though the code change itself is likely small. Because we don't know if there is more than a single user that can actually benefit from it, if it has unintended consequences, or if it causes maintainence issue down the road.
jacquesm 17 hours ago
> I'm interested in how that turns out 6 months later.
That really is the real question, isn't it?
For me it has been a mixed bag so far, I've seen some companies use this tech in a slow and deliberate manner to do what they were already doing but a little bit faster. I've also seen hail Mary passes where the whole codebase was turned over to agents to go wild on with an undersized team and little to no QA. Time will tell...
ctoth 18 hours ago
> but withhold from others, even though the code change itself is likely small.
Prediction: programming is going to change massively not only because the cost of creating code will go down, but because people are so tired of this sort of gatekeeping "we know better" from programmers.
eterm 18 hours ago
ctoth 15 hours ago
ljm 17 hours ago
ethin 16 hours ago
datadrivenangel 18 hours ago
grey-area 4 hours ago
mjr00 18 hours ago
procone 20 hours ago
YAML is a nightmare fuel spec.
In its quest to make markup "human readable", it has created countless footguns.
I honestly prefer XML at this point.
doix 19 hours ago
Yeah, the YAMLification of everything kinda killed my ability to understand "everything". Previously, if you knew the Linux userland well, I felt like you could figure anything out with enough digging.
Take CI for example, it was Jenkins and it ran a csh/bash/zsh whatever script and captured the output. Nice and simple (even if the scripts sometimes got insane).
GitHub actions is nothing like that. Weird home grown extensions to YAML with their own idiosyncrasies and dynamically pulling in plugins from god knows where. You can't just take a workflow and execute it locally like you could with a bash script.
twistedpair 28 minutes ago
Lack of a local runner is my biggest peeve. Any novel GHA workflow creation results in a PR with 100 commits, until you can finally sort out all the non-obvious idiosyncrasies. For any modestly complex workflow, I move everything to a bash or TS file and call that, and then you can use _coding tools_ and a _local_ dev/eval loop.
How funny that GitHub Actions' lack of tools forces you to make a bunch of billed cloud runs with GitHub for workflow edits. I'm sure their PMs are very concerned about this trend.
muvlon 18 hours ago
And worse: GitHub Actions not a full-fledged programming environment by itself either, so you're inevitably going to have to deal with nontrivial shell scripts on top of all the YAML mess.
fragmede 18 hours ago
jeroenhd 17 hours ago
The things done in yaml today would've been obscure bash oneliners had YAML not existed.
Jenkins still exists and it's no less complicated than Github Actions. The complexity gets hidden in obscure script files, obscure tabbed UI, and remote services for doing things Jenkins itself can't do. Defaulting to system tooling makes it almost impossible to predict what a job will do unless you know exactly how paths and tooling are set up (and what versions they're running).
None of my personal experiences with Jenkins had scripts that ran locally, they all relied on pre-installed software on the server because that was the thing people would do before the great YAMLification. You could copy-paste the Jenkins job, but unless you have Jabberwocky v2018.3 installed in /home/JabberWock/RELEASE, the script will fail.
The entire software development flow has been made incredibly complex by hooking up automations into every nook and cranny.
All of these complications need to be enabled manually, though. If your flow is complicated, you can cut it down to manageable size by doing a few more processes manually.
Luckily, all of the simplication and reproduction steps for Github also apply to Jenkins. Github YAML files are just scripts with different syntax, after all. Just like you can run bash locally, you can run act and reproduce whatever Github trigger you need. From there, you can simplify pipelines, stop curl2bashing "plugins", and so on.
itintheory 15 hours ago
doix 7 hours ago
ljm 16 hours ago
anonymars 19 hours ago
In a similar vein, JSON's lack of comments makes me marvel at how consistently JavaScript seems to choose the worse option. I'm oh so glad it found its way into config files
tuveson 15 hours ago
As a data/serialization format (the original intended use of JSON), I think no comments is the right choice, since adding comments introduces a bunch of questions about how comments ought to be parsed into a datastructure (or if they should be sent/(de)serialized at all). But for config files the lack of comments is the wrong choice, since typically you want to explain why things are set the way they are. The lack of ordering of entries also makes total sense for data/(de)serialization, but makes no sense for a config. I think the problem is people are lazy and just want to JSON.parse() everything, and used JSON in places it doesn't belong, like config files.
frollogaston 6 hours ago
an0malous 19 hours ago
Seems more like the opposite vein, JSON's lack of comments or other affordances has kept it safe from footguns
madeofpalk 19 hours ago
xgulfie 19 hours ago
I've seen people put "//" keys in their json lol
reddalo 18 hours ago
hutattedonmyarm 17 hours ago
stronglikedan 18 hours ago
fmbb 20 hours ago
It’s find for actions and workflows as long as you do no interpolation and logic.
Better move as much of that as possible into your own scripts. And your scripts can be portable between forges, and even run locally!
RHSeeger 19 hours ago
The YAML spec/parse _itself_ does interpolation and logic - incorrectly in some cases. YAML is pretty much never the right solution.
NewJazz 19 hours ago
Assigning an env var to an empty variable (env: { myvar: ${{unsetfoo}} }) should trigger an error, not silently pass an empty string.
ezfe 19 hours ago
formerly_proven 19 hours ago
> It’s find for actions and workflows as long as you do no interpolation and logic.
How do you specify actions and workflows without interpolation and logic kind sir?
NewJazz 18 hours ago
hbn 19 hours ago
I never figured out how the hell to write YAML and I definitely won't now that I trust the AI to do a better job than me. It's so unintuitive.
Every time I've tried in the past, something as simple as making a value a list had some nonsense expectations. I can't wrap my head around how that spec got any traction and wasn't laughed off the face of the earth the first time it was looked at by someone who didn't create it.
frollogaston 6 hours ago
I don't get it either. There was a point where I had to write YAML, but it wasn't intuitive to begin with, and months in I was still accidentally setting the wrong number of indents or some nonsense.
voakbasda 17 hours ago
When I see YAML in a product tech stack, I know that the developers have probably made other similarly poor life decisions and try to steer clear of the entire iceberg.
cgannett 19 hours ago
And thus procone spoketh the truth.
codeduck 19 hours ago
In accordance with the prophecy.
frollogaston 6 hours ago
Textproto is such much better than YAML for everything that YAML is used for. Sure, JSON has plenty of uses, but YAML is specifically used for configs that it's terrible at.
vultour 19 hours ago
The first linked PR (#1218) has only one commit co-authored by Copilot and it's not related to the vulnerability, and neither are the other suggestions in the PR. Am I missing something?
croemer 17 hours ago
You're correct. The issue was introduced in this commit by a human not by copilot: https://github.com/snowflakedb/snowflake-connector-net/pull/...
However, GitHub Advanced Security, a bot, flagged something but not the real issue. So maybe that bot contributed a false sense of security.
Commit: https://github.com/snowflakedb/snowflake-connector-net/pull/...
galnagli 19 hours ago
Github is having some problems -- will check! thanks a lot!
vultour 18 hours ago
I must be too tired because I cannot figure out what happened in that pull request. The PR/source branch was over a year old with none of the commits adding up to the full diff. There is [1], which introduced the vulnerability but didn't remove the environment variables above, then master is merged into it via [2] (but still doesn't show the variables being removed), yet in the full PR diff they're gone.
In any case, I'm pretty sure you misattributed the vulnerability to Copilot because the PR got squash-merged and _all_ of the changes were then attributed to every contributor in that PR, despite Copilot only appearing on one of the commits.
[1] https://github.com/snowflakedb/snowflake-connector-net/commi...
[2] https://github.com/snowflakedb/snowflake-connector-net/commi...
croemer 17 hours ago
KronisLV 2 hours ago
Where’s the bullet point about the way we do programming being horrible? Not even the work, but the tools and languages afforded to us.
github.event.issue.title is very obviously data. It should never be POSSIBLE to treat that as an instruction.
Furthermore, the idea of any code being able to access the tokens instead of allowlisted software and only with specific commands, and also no housekeeping to prevent the DATA of the token from ever being sent to anything other than a desired host… all of it feels fundamentally wrong.
The fact that our OSes don’t help with that is so saddening.
david_shaw 16 hours ago
We're going to see more of this before we see, hopefully, substantially less of it.
What I'm seeing now in industry -- and I think this autofix issue is a precise example of it -- is a natural evolution of the "LGTM!" review that's so prevalent in software development and similar disciplines.
For years, the dramatic majority of "code review" was a quick glance followed by "Looks good to me." Sure, critical workflows have more scrutiny. Sure, not everyone fell victim to this trap. Sure, there are many exceptions. But it's a meme for a reason: most people weren't really reviewing code assigned to them. They were effectively rubber-stamping most things.
So now, in the age of AI, those same people are (sometimes still) expected to be responsible for what their automated developer friend Claude is doing. It's absolutely unreasonable to think that most people are giving the PR more than a glance, and in many organizations they're explicitly trying to remove humans from the loop.
One day, AI development and code review will be so good that mistakes like this will be extraordinarily rare. For the near-future, though, I anticipate we'll see more of this before we see less.
worldsayshi 15 hours ago
Yeah I agree and I think code forges as well as AI harnesses are kinda the killer apps of this (relatively short) era.
I think once we figure out how to tighten the loop of user feedback, expert analysis, automatic/static verification and AI generation then technology is going to make another leap.
stefan_ 3 hours ago
That's mostly because at some point a wave of nonsense swept over the field that brought with it the Scrum master, agile, pairing, middle managers thinking up elaborate Git branching schemes (they don't understand Git) and of course, the mandatory code review.
It's best to take all these things in moderation.
zapataband1 16 hours ago
lol keep dreaming bro, mistakes like these were "extroardinarily rare" before LLM companies reared their thieving hands.
cj 16 hours ago
“There is absolutely no way Bitcoin will ever trade for more than $200.. Impossible!” he said.
sippeangelo 20 hours ago
The title is actually "Wiz Red Agent Finds Its Way Into Snowflake’s Internal Jira Due to an AI-Generated GitHub Copilot Autofix"
galnagli 20 hours ago
Too long for hackernews :(
diego_sandoval 17 hours ago
I know like 3 of those words.
nevertoolate 16 hours ago
They didn’t really sell this PR well:
> Workflows like jira_close.yml use deprecated atlassian JIRA actions and have a dependency on the gh-actions repo. This is not ideal and unecessarily complex.
And then goes on:
> PR updates jira_close workflow to use direct API calls via curl.
Duplicating the logic into OUR codebase via a hand rolled curl, so we can get rid of “needless abstractions”. Auch. And of course the whole thing embedded into a yaml file.
This code is the typical kaleidoscope sometimes written by junior devs (and LLMs). On review you just kindly ask to be rewritten into a simple program or just close it as the effort doesn’t worth it.
teraflop 20 hours ago
> The workflow had an if: condition that appeared protective:
> if: (github.event_name == 'issues' && github.event.pull_request.user.login != 'whitesource-for-github-com[bot]')
> However, on issues events, github.event.pull_request is always null.
This is extra dumb because even if you thought this condition was correctly testing the user's identity, it shouldn't have "appeared protective" upon even a moment's thought. If it worked correctly, it would obviously just exclude one bot user while allowing all other users, so it wouldn't provide any protection at all.
But more likely, this condition was never intended to be "protective" at all, and it's only being described that way because the writeup is LLM slop.
johnwils 19 hours ago
The env + jq was there on purpose. Autofix swapped it for a string in a shell. That's the part that needed a person on the diff.
cowthulhu 18 hours ago
This really shows why most languages evaluate all NULL comparisons to FALSE.
For something as critical as Actions, it’s crazy to me that they wouldn’t fail-closed, and instead fail open when encountering a null. Scary stuff!
chrisjj 20 hours ago
> a single quote in the title breaks out of echo '...' and allows arbitrary command execution.
Quote injection still alive and well in 2026. Gawd.
myself248 18 hours ago
It's appalling that computing in general, and unix in particular, seems to have this habit of intermingling payload and overhead.
It's like in-band signalling in the telephone network, where if you whistled the right tones into your call, you could affect the way the network processed said call. Except Ma Bell responded to that system being exploited by designing a comprehensive overhaul of the way signalling was handled, and spent a squadzillion dollars upgrading millions of tons of switching equipment to categorically exclude that entire class of attack from ever being possible.
Software, on the other hand, would need to replace no equipment whatsoever. Existing processors are perfectly capable of running code that handles the length of a string separately from its contents. There are existing languages that do this, they're just.... not used. String escapes and buffer overflows exist, going on decades now, due to nothing more than laziness, inertia, and negligence.
chrisjj 16 hours ago
And now the "AI" industry is doubling down on it - with hatbot prompt injection.
simoncion 17 hours ago
> It's like in-band signalling in the telephone network...
The major LLM providers claim that they are very committed to security and that their products are very dangerous and capable of great harm.
Given that their tools do what Ma Bell's systems did in the mid-1900s, [0] -which the entire software world relearned was a terrible idea by the early 1990s- they are definitely
1) Lying about the extent of their commitment to security
2) Lying about the extent of the harm that their tools are capable of
3) Both
My money is on #3.
Because of the fact that -in the absence of unambiguous laws that require meaningfully-severe punishment- even the most fucknasty and amateur hour security failures nearly always have little to no impact on the company that causes them, the major LLM providers have absolutely done the smart thing by providing commercial tools that have remote code execution vulns that would automatically give them a Critical CVSS score.
To put it another way: "the market" has no idea how to evaluate computer security claims. Because of this, every dollar you spend on proactively fixing security problems is nearly always a dollar wasted... it's better to wait until someone important gets Big Mad before spending the money. Does this make the world worse? Absolutely! Does this make companies selling software and software services much more money? Definitely!
[0] If the major LLM providers did separate unsanitized data from program instructions and ensure that the two are never mixed, things like [1] would not be possible.
[1] <https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/08/prompt-inject...>
frollogaston 6 hours ago
I recently called some website's tech support because their web form was giving error 500. They said I need to make sure there were no single quotes in the form. Horrifying enough, removing the single quote fixed it. So they've either got SQL injection or something even worse.
TheRealPomax 20 hours ago
No, Snowflake allowing autofixes compromised their Jira. If you tell someone to shoot you in the foot, and they shoot you in the foot, you shot yourself in the foot, just with more steps. If someone else finds the memo that says you've set up foot shooting as a service, and then they trigger that service, you still shot yourself in the foot.
rawgabbit 19 hours ago
Help me understand. Snowflake configured their Github repo to allow auto fixes by Copilot. It got merged automatically without anyone's review? And introduced essentially script-injection vulnerability through the title field?
If this is the case, I would say Snowflake should shut down its repo and get off Github asap.
rafram 19 hours ago
No. A Snowflake maintainer opened a PR, Copilot suggested a change (introducing a vulnerability), the maintainer accepted and committed it to their PR, and another Snowflake maintainer approved and merged the PR.
otterley 17 hours ago
lelanthran 18 hours ago
rawgabbit 18 hours ago
CodeWithLeo 18 hours ago
The interesting lesson here isn't really “AI generated insecure code.” We've had insecure code for decades. The bigger issue is that AI makes it much cheaper to introduce changes, while the cost of reviewing those changes hasn't gone down nearly as much.
The bottleneck is moving from code generation to code verification.
supriyo-biswas 15 hours ago
Please do not post LLM generated comments here. Thank you.
kshacker 13 hours ago
What made you make that assessment?
bakugo 13 hours ago
h4kunamata 12 hours ago
Human error.
AI generated code, must be scanned for code quality, SAST, SCA, etc, just like a developer's code would.
It looks like they accepted AI code without verifying. Deserved!
tripdout 17 hours ago
Why is the original pattern (with the env var in double quotes) not vulnerable? Why can you close the single quotes early but you can't just include double quotes in your title? Is it something to do with the GitHub templating?
benmmurphy 15 minutes ago
i'm not sure if there was an original pattern where the env var was in double quotes.
https://github.com/snowflakedb/snowflake-connector-net/pull/...
but if you have:
X=$(echo "$BLAH")
then in bash I believe this is safe, because bash will just substitute this as putting the BLAH variable as the first argument to echo without doing any further parsing. without the double quotes can be safe as well but more risky.
X=$(echo $BLAH)
and the only difference is bash will split the arguments. so if you have BLAH="x y" then bash will pass two arguments to echo. though, this can be dangerous if the command you are invoking has dangerous command line options.
however, they had something similar to:
TITLE=$(echo '${{ github.event.issue.title }}')
and this ${{ }} is some kind of template substitution that is happening before the command is sent to bash. so if the variable `github.event.issue.title` was `foo bar` then bash sees something like:
TITLE=$(echo 'foo bar')
and then you start to have problems because `'` can be put into the title to escape.
the bash variable substitution will protect you in a lot of cases from command line injection but if you pass user input directly into command evaluation without using variables then bash can't protect you.
m4rtink 10 hours ago
I think GitHub itself could use a nice "Autofix" right about now. ;-)
forestry 20 hours ago
Peer review of changes is still important.
Rumudiez 20 hours ago
Multi-model cross-review is important
_joel 19 hours ago
I'm all for using a council of LLMs, I wrote a tool for it https://github.com/joelio/owl - but you still need to read through PRs yourself, at the very least.
acedTrex 20 hours ago
It's not actually, thats just shoving more shit into the shit pipeline.
Humans need to review this stuff yall there's no way around that, apparently to some, very inconvenient reality.
devin 20 hours ago
Twirrim 20 hours ago
You can't rely on people spotting the significance of such changes
eithed 20 hours ago
Tests would have caught it = https://github.com/rhysd/actionlint injection check
thejosh 20 hours ago
dv_dt 20 hours ago
I have been talking to people who want to autoreview and autoapprove "minor" AI prs. For security especially, I think if the models weren't enough to prevent the issues, they aren't enough to judge what is minor.
fn-mote 20 hours ago
^^
Absolutely.
Nothing in the PR jumps out as a red flag. Unless you know how the internals work, I suppose.
bigfishrunning 16 hours ago
larsonian 19 hours ago
chrisjj 20 hours ago
AIorNot 16 hours ago
Sheesh these anti ai posts feel like when I hear about a self driving car is doing something bad.. ie 'man bites dog' vs 'dog bites man'
Human responsibility over AI oversight folks.. even forgoing AI, we're still gonna get compromised code either way.. deal with it.
antiloper 20 hours ago
Someone forgot to add "make no mistakes!" when triggering autofix /s
kozikow 18 hours ago
Issues will happen AI, or not AI. It's same as "self driving car made an accident"!
I'm not saying blindly trusting auto-fix is not bad. I'm just saying that interpreting singular issue as way to downplay AI-assisted engineering without giving a "denominator" is not honest reporting.