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If the vulnerability is already being exploited in the wild --- as in, it's a vector people already know about and are tracking --- it's possibly not worth much at all. Vulnerability valuations depend heavily on the lifespan of the vulnerability; payments on black market are tranched (explicitly or less explicitly, as with "maintenance payments") based on whether they're patched.

Further: a vulnerability is probably not worth that much either, even if it's a hypercapable vulnerability, because the grey market buys full enablement kits, not vulnerability information. People making 6 figures on vulnerabilities are selling fully enabled full chain exploit systems, not just intelligence about a sandbox escape.

While I agree 1000 is hilariously low for this, worth is hard to quantify. Do you pay what it could theoretically cost your company? the amount the top bidding bad actor would be willing to pay?

you're taking someone's word it's being exploited. It says right at the top of the report

> allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code *inside the sandbox*

A bug in V8 leads to code execution in Chrome's web page process. It does not lead to execution in general. For that you need other exploits that escape the web page process. Those are not detailed here. This CVE is not a big deal. You're responding the poster's title, not the actual CVE

Makes you wonder how many hacks wouldn't have occurred if security researchers (and vulnerability disclosure) was actually rewarded proportional to the possible/potential damage said vulnerability may have otherwise caused.

It's insulting how poorly incentivised white hats are, just look at how much North Korea is raking in with their cyber shenanigans - current estimates put it at around $6.75 billion to date (over the past 10 years or so).

If you really explore the concept of worth, Google "engineers" are grossly overpaid, otherwise they would have found this themselves already.

How many PMs are making more than bug bounties to fetch coffee and bagels?

Their priorities are all out of order.

There are plenty of people out there who find vulnerabilities and sell them to the highest bidder. Anyone is welcome to do it, including the researchers and hackers reporting them responsibly. There's no need to try and make a convoluted ethical justification. "I did this bad thing because you didn't pay me enough not to" doesn't work past the 6th grade.

If this would have included a full RCE chain with Sandbox escape Google would have paid significantly more.

Having just a Sandbox RCE is neat, I've got some on my laptop currently, but it's just a piece of the puzzle.

Interesting question, and how much should a user pay Google to fix the vulnerability? I suppose the smallest unit of currency less than the amount of effort they'd have to put in to mitigate it. A fully market economy of bug fixing here is an interesting idea, certainly, but if I'm being honest I actually don't want to pay Google a thousand dollars to fix security issues. In the limit, what would happen is that I end up with the competitor browser Elgoog Emorhc which fixes security issues for free, and pays very little for them, which is the status quo.

In the world where security issues are paid for entirely at market rate, it would also be very important to not use browsers by poor groups because they would be unable to pay for security reports on the market and consequently the browsers would be less secure.

Interesting idea, for sure, but I don't think it lands in a place I want to go since I neither desire stochastic payments nor desire that all browsers should be from large corporations.

> How much do you think an organization like Google would spend on, for example, AI tokens or compute to detect this internally before it was found and exploited in the wild?

On average, probably not that much. What's the amortized cost of all testing, static analysis, and audit / code review, per "prevented potential bug"?

It sounds insultingly low, yeah. I'm trying to imagine why they would pay so little. The only two reasons I can think of are either (a) they were already aware of it and fixing it, and therefore the report didn't really change much, or (b) it requires an unusual configuration or otherwise rare opportunity to that makes it impractical to exploit most users. Really curious to see what the issue was whenever it gets made public.

> But at the same time, if someone submits a critical issue like this, it makes sense to pay them what the bug's actually worth.

I'd point out that part of the reason the grey and black market pays so well is because it is that type of market. You have to pay people extra to look past their morals and a risk premium against potential reputational and legal consequences.

That said, the gap is probably not just that.

this is why again, researchers should just honestly sell these to vuln brokers instead of donating them to trillion dollar companies for nothing.

nothing will change until big tech can no longer rip off security researchers

People are free to pool their money and offer higher bounties.

"because researchers shouldn't hold bugs for ransom or demand high payment" Maybe they should now, not like anyone else cares about ethics anyway.

> Ethical disclosure is a complicated topic, because researchers shouldn't hold bugs for ransom or demand high payment.

Why not? Capitalism requires they maximize their value. These profitable companies lay bare at the altar, so they should understand the requirements of their god.

The problem is they are being flooded with both fake AND real disclosures. Imagine if they tried to pay out $250,000 or more per bug? Would the cost be worth it? Maybe, but shareholders may not be pleased... Unless they viewed it as insurance against it being more financially sound for the finder to sell the exploit on the gray or black market instead...

> Ethical disclosure is a complicated topic, because researchers shouldn't hold bugs for ransom or demand high payment.

I mean, why not?

Seems like it was worth $1000 to the researcher in question.

The CVE associated with it (CVE-2026-85046) is already being exploited in the wild. If we put our thinking caps on, how much do you think this vulnerability is actually worth? How much do you think an organization like Google would spend on, for example, AI tokens or compute to detect this internally before it was found and exploited in the wild?

in the darkweb, due to crypto, a lot. there is where the $ is, whether it's stealing crypto directly or phishing developers.

>researchers shouldn't hold bugs for ransom or demand high payment.

Hell no, the same level bugs at Google should be enthusiastically paid way more than from an undercapitalized startup, who actually needs the help more so. Should be orders of magnitude difference in relation to scale.

>it makes sense to pay them what the bug's actually worth.

Honest fair-dealing should come into play at least but there are some players who have struck it so rich they can now take enough pride to pay an additional premium just because they can, and their good human nature almost compels them ethically to do way more than the minimum.

Just apparently not at Google.

If a company has achieved financial success to a degree that they are no longer worried about complete failure for the foreseeable future, then it's only a matter of generosity vs Scrooge-like behavior.

What's missing from their overall business acumen if they can't even afford to project an image of generosity yet?

If they're not actively making a serious effort to pay the maximum they can well afford for bugs that are truly serious, there is a technical term for that. Chickenshit.

I think the problem is that we've let JS engines become absurdly complex so there's no way to avoid them having really gross bugs.

That said, I think that the V8 team has done a fantastic job of securing their engine. Their heap sandbox feature is really inspiring! It's really wild that (as far as I can understand this issue) someone is able to bypass it.

(Posted from a memory safe browser - WebKit MiniBrowser compiled with Fil-C. Pretty sure this is safer than even V8 and the heap sandbox.)

Running code by itself isn't that bad, it's the fact that browser developers have decided for some reason that this code needs to be as performant as possible, so, JIT.

I don't get it! The way JS is typically used, it doesn't even benefit from JIT all that much. Making ajax requests, doing stuff with strings, and moving DOM elements around doesn't need every CPU clock cycle to be used as optimally as possible. It's exceedingly rare for websites to actually be doing something that needs raw performance. And SPAs will be slow no matter what.

> decision we have made

This might oversell the agency that practicioners have.

Sandboxed zero-install delivery will outcompete anything with more frictionful installs.

It's probably not the right model for a pacemaker though.

Web/JS has been a double-edged sword for FOSS: sure, I can run a free OS, but if most of my "apps" happen to be JS that I can't practically control, then I have won a battle and lost a war.

I remember noticing this shift in nerd culture. In the early 2000s, it was common for people to say on places like Slashdot that they don't trust JavaScript and run their browser with it off. In the early 2010s, I noticed HN commenters thought this was insane, tinfoil hat type thinking.

In the future we can ask that your JaveScript and Wasm comes with a proof of being benign.

V8 as a runtime goes far deeper than just webpages.

They just released a CVE for a garbage truck vulnerability where an attacker could brick the vehicle by exploiting the telemetry system these things now have preinstalled in factory.

There's been a Chrome CVE like every week ever since it came out.

Is graphene even affected? JIT is disabled in default configurations.

This issue is already fixed in Google Chrome (152.0.7977.83)

The release version just now updated to 152.0.7977.83 which has the fix.

Yes, it says right in the CVE

> allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code *inside the sandbox*

Wait, you have that working? What's the lowest friction to run it? Like, VM or docker container or...

For it to be memory safe, do you have to disable the JIT?

by nature of being in the "known exploited vulnerabilities catalog" (https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog...)

"CISA maintains the authoritative source of vulnerabilities that have been exploited in the wild."

This line, I think? >This CVE is in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog

"Google has confirmed that an exploit exists in the wild but has not disclosed information about the threat actors, targeted organizations, or attack campaigns while the update is still rolling out."

There's a risk that someone had been sitting on a sandbox escape that assumed having RCE inside the sandbox first, and so they'd been waiting for an RCE exactly like this one.

Those folks would not be disclosing their sandbox escape unless they were good guys.

(Posted with a memory safe WebKit, Fil-C FTW)

If it's in the CISA known exploited vulnerabilities catalog, tell me if I'm wrong but I assume people don't go around exploiting million dollar 0-days in public just to fuck around safely in a chrome sandbox.

So maybe we're going to see another CVE for the sandbox escape soon?

Crypto mining would be one application. But also, combined with a sandbox escape would make it particularly devastating. Usually full control of a device takes at least two exploits given the layers of security present in OS and browser environments.

Monocultures are great!

I know a regular old geezer who's written his own obituary. Publish this when I die.

I bet famous people have their people write one to distribute immediately.

Also, writing those for your family sucks, easier to do it when they are alive and can tell some key stories.

Anyone who sells such an exploit should go to prison.

This seems irrelevant as the issue talks about being exploitable with a crafted HTML page, no mention of JS. If true, you would be able to be hit without js enabled.

what planet are you living on

RCE inside sandbox, so requires chaining with another 0day.

Chrome product management is horrible. Chrome software engineering is some of the best ever done.

(And no, I don't use it except for testing).

Which browser has a better security track record?

Of all the reasons to use non-Chromium browsers whenever possible(!), this isn’t really on the list.

This is like saying never use seatbelts because people still die in car accidents.

Chromium is still far superior on the security front than any other browser.

Oh, right, because other browsers never have bugs.

If we needed any more.

chrome has more bugs, not necessarily because it's less secure, but its popularity makes it a bigger target, so more bugs are found