Hacker News

A lot of people are focusing on how irresponsible the engineer was about using the work computer. That's obviously an issue but the bigger failure mode to me is the Engineer C's container deployment token.

That's a huge red-flag. In a company of this size, the deployments should be via CI only. CI isn't just to increase the speed and reliability of deployments but also to provide a clean room to build the software! Even if it's a token that was copied and pasted temporarily, the systems in place should not have to require this type of 1. copy 2. paste 3. remember-to-delete the token from my PC.

Also, Binance should be paying for intrusion testing. Better to pay a trusted company to do this kind of thing instead of letting North Korea show you how it's done. I don't think this exact exploit path would have been found but I bet the intrusion testing would have figured out another way to use Engineer C's token.

Doing ANYTHING on a work issued laptop outside of your role is such a dumb idea for a litany of obvious reasons that I'm genuinely shocked people do it. Let alone participate in interviews for other companies on it.

Anec-data - as an interviewer, last year, I had my first sketchy, perhaps 'North Korean', candidate.

The name on the CV, was, for the sake of privacy, Michael Smith, from Australia, and ticked the right boxes.

We'd expect a fluent, Aussie-accented English speaker. Instead, we had a candidate with a webcam that wouldn't work (weird!!), with clearly accented English of a East-Asian background. I suppose there's a vanishing chance they really were Mike Smith of Adelaide or wherever, but we couldn't take that chance. We tried rescheduling, but tumbleweeds...

Pretty funny that tech makes candidates jump through all sorts of automated, inhumane loops to even advance to talking to a real human in the hiring process.

And now you get results like this.

No one wants to talk about the "internal AI Tool" being used to elevate to not 1 but 2 DevOps engineers?

> use of an internal AI tool as a springboard. The attacker leveraged the compromised computer of engineer B and used an internal AI tool to gain control over the Wallet DevOps Engineer A and another Wallet Software Engineer C. The attacker soon discovered Wallet DevOps Engineer A had a container deployment permission token on his computer.

With the AI craze going on recently I've worked at multiple companies where an internal AI tool was vibecoded and I've always been worried about the security implications.

Imagine being able to steal billions in crypto from your work laptop and using same laptop to run code sent to you by another company. I wish I had their problems.

It is crazy that this Engineer A fell for this malware ad (how do people still fall for these & how does Google still get away with serving malware like that):

https://isc.sans.edu/diary/32942

It is kind of weird that they mention it though, if they replaced the devices and rotated credentials? Just to later mention that an "internal AI tool" was used to steal that Engineer As credentials again?

And also, what are those "obfuscation techniques"? It looks very straight forward, replacing the pyenv, there's nothing much obfuscated in it? Except for putting it in a different folder.

I was #opentowork on LinkedIn and got approached multiple times with fake companies and interviews. LinkedIn is not doing enough to combat this.

I even create a 1 man company for my consulting services and I receive ads about how people at my company saved me a spot on an online game.

LinkedIn is partially responsible for their neglect here.

I actually got contacted by North Koreans posing as Japanese VC looking to partner in the Nordics. I have an agent that scans my emails and does the inverse filtering, suggests when I should take a look. This is because I get insane amount of cold inbound. But it also flags suspicious emails and uses network tools to find out info about the sender. It flagged that one as a NK account (I later confirmed it was already flagged on the watch list in various reddit channels). Everyone should be arming themselves with email filtering agents now. What I’m worried about is grandmas and grandpas and general ppl that are behind the tech curve.

Source posted earlier: "29 October Binance Security Incident: Initial Findings and Response Update" https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50359377

Why did the employee have direct access to $6.3 billion in customer funds?

I have been getting these since early 2023, still, most of them are simple to spot, the other side typically has video turned off, asks a bit about your experience and just nods without digging, they are in a hurry to send you their coding challenge.

In one of these many calls I got to see the face from the other side but lasted a few seconds only. Then he claimed that internet was bad and suggested we continued without video.

In this case they claim it was a 2 rounds interview with video turned on to simulate a more normal recruiting process.

Of course all of us are prone to get caught with the shield off but what surprises me is that the targeted dev took the challenge in the device from work.

Running interview assignment on a work computer… tsk tsk

Further evidence that 1) recruiting is broken and 2) developers make great targets, and we need to respond accordingly.

Pretty sure it was his last job interview ever

It's just a cherry on top of the existing hiring process in the IT. It wouldn't surprised that it will make things even worse - companies will be more scared to talk to anyone and good candidates will be scared to reply

How do these dumb people that have access to billions of funds fall to these fake interviews?

If she hadn't done it on her work laptop, her personal would have been pwned anyway. It's not clear to me how to protect oneself while also looking for work.

These are simply malicious interviews, not fake. If your company is important enough, you've got one or two inside already.

I think we have reached peak whatever we're in. I think from here on out, things are gonna change.

Good thing they didn't get anything important.

If you want to learn more about the Lazarus group behind this heist, the BBC did an excellent podcast on another one of their operations:

https://www.bbc.com/audio/series/w27vqd03

(It's also on Spotify, Apple Podcasts etc)

My hunch is that this was partly an inside job. The "fake job interview" and "mistakenly downloaded trojaned homebrew" stories are to give plausible deniability. But they're not very plausible imho.

>> "...and is working with law enforcement, blockchain intel firms, and security researchers to trace and freeze the assets. The crypto exchange has also hired independent cybersecurity experts to conduct a cybersecurity review of the incident, and recommend additional protective measures."

>> trace and freeze the assets

It has gotten to the point where the advertised permanence of cryptocoin transactions is a serous national security threat, literally funneling $6+billion to a nation-state whose publicly avowed statements is to destroy the US to fund its nuclear weapons program.

The party is ending. The house lights are flashing. Crypto will either become controlled so illegitimate transactions will be roll-back-able (presumably with proper court or NatSec orders), or it will be banned.

This is Binance/CZ's version of the story, but no one really knows the truth.

They have a massive incentive to invent a story to cover up the incident. I'm not saying it's a cover-up, but the motive is definitely there.

North Korea has denied responsibility, whereas they usually own up to their actions.

Disregarding that, it just doesn't make sense for their internal security to be so lax.

I've worked at big companies but with AUM lower than Binance, a lot of control and safeguards are in place to prevent one "rogue" employee from stealing everything.

It's pretty much impossible for a company like Binance to not have implemented such things. I do not buy it.

Founder of Callstrike here .. we build real time deepfake & voice impersonation attack simulation tools for a living so this is literally what I deal with every day.

The biggest irony is that we get at least a couple of signups every month from South Korea, Russia, India, Nigeria just to try getting access to our platform for running these attacks ..

Here is the most recent copy paste from a Calendly invite ..

>Invitee Email: >ashley@cairnsovereign.net

>Invitee Time Zone: >Central European Time

>Questions:

>Please share anything that will help prepare for our meeting.

>We are an MSP from the UK that is look for a deepfake platform to run campaigns for our clients. We typically use open source software but there is a gap in our portfolio for deepfake testing that we can't fill with our usual open source philosophy.

The company website https://www.cairnsovereign.net/ was registered just 2 days ago .. they have no linkedin presence, fake CEO and fake CTO and fake everything ..

I still accepted the invite and joined and the person has a strong northern british accent .. he askd me to let his AI bot join the call to take notes ... i refused .. to which he swore and said that if a meeting bot is not allowed .. then i dont want to talk and abruptly hung up ...

PS: if anyone wants to see .. this is what a real time voice impersonation call and real time deepfake faceswap .. looks like ..

https://www.callstrike.ai/deepfake-security-training

https://www.callstrike.ai/voice-phishing-simulator

People from big companies I talk to all the time are now pulling into h I secops teams to literally assed whether a candidate is safe. It's getting very expensive.

It's one of the reason ojcp exists.

What surprises me most about the Binance hacking story is that Binance employees seem to have used their work laptops for some "programming test" (whose purpose was - as we now know - spreading malware).

I mean: if you even consider leaving your current company, you better leave no traces of your plan on your work laptop: you either use a private laptop or, even better, some burner laptop/computer that you reset afterwards.

Am I the only one baffled by the fact that the engineer uses a work PC for a personal job interview assignment?

[dupe] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50353818

Zoom exploits could have done this without downloads. I don't interview on a computer with sensitive data, it's usually a throwaway. I sometimes get judged for doing the interview on a Chromebook or an old Mac and I hope that interviewers understand why I choose to do it this way.

A lot of detail on what Engineer A, B and C did. But this would've been prevented if Engineer A didn't have "a container deployment permission token on his computer".

What the fuck? On a target as big as Binance? Every developer should be treated as a liability and never be able to deploy by themselves.

I love these guys!

It's strange companies haven't cracked something as basic as remote hiring checks yet.

There are tools available to stop AI screen recording tools, fake candidate tools yet many companies keep getting hit..

I think we need to implement a new handshake protocol for job interviews.

Both candidate and recruiter have to call Kim Jong Un a big fat tosser (other swearwords are available) on a recorded video before the interview continues.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g7v2clX8ynE